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4 5	Attorney for Plaintiffs Open Source Security Inc. & Bradley Spengler			
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7	UNITED STATES	S DISTRICT COURT		
8	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION			
9		Cose No. + 2:17 or 04002 L D		
10 11	OPEN SOURCE SECURITY INC. and BRADLEY SPENGLER	Case No.: 3:17-cv-04002-LB		
12	Plaintiff,	PLAINTIFFS' OPPOSITION TO DEFENDENT'S MOTION FOR		
13	V.	ATTORNEY'S FEES PURSUANT TO CALIFORNIA CODE OF CIVIL		
14	BRUCE PERENS, and Does 1-50,	PROCEDURE § 425.16(C); DECLARATION OF ROHIT CHHABRA		
15	Defendants.	IN SUPPORT THEREOF; AND DECLARATION OF FEE EXPERT WITNESS WILLIAM NORMAN IN		
16		SUPPORT THEROF.		
17				
18		Hearing Date: March 29, 2018 Time: 9:30 a.m.		
19		Location: Courtroom C, 15th Floor Judge: Hon. Laurel Beeler		
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23 24	REDACTED VERSION OF DOCUMENT(S) SOUGHT TO BE SEALED – PURSUANT TO COURT ORDER			
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20	PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT PERENS' SEC TO STRIKE	COND MOTION TO DISMISS AND SECOND SPECIAL MOTION		

1	Table of Contents
2	
3	I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
5	II. THE COSTS AND FEES DEFENDANTS REQUEST IN THEIR EXPENSE REPORT ARE UNREASONABLE, EXCESSIVE, AND UNNECESSARY
5	A. A SUBSTANTIAL PORTION OF THE FEES AND COSTS SUBMITTED BY DEFENDANT IS NOT RECOVERABLE UNDER § 425.16(C)
3	B. 48% OF THE TIMEKEEPING RECORDS HAVE "DOCTORED" FEES AND/OR HOURS CLAIMS AND CANNOT BE CONSIDERED AS A RELIABLE SOURCE; NEITHER CAN ANY DECLARATION BE CONSIDERED RELIABLE THAT IS BASED ON THE ERRONEOUS TIMEKEEPING RECORDS
)	C. THE TIMEKEEPING RECORDS HAVE AMBIGUOUS OR INCOMPLETE INFORMATION 1
)	D. DUPLICATIVE, EXCESSIVE, IRRELEVANT AND INEFFICIENT PRACTICES
	E. MOTION DRAFTING: TIME SPENT DRAFTING, REVISING, CONFERRING AND RESEARCHING THE MOTIONS WAS EXCESSIVE
2	F. HOURLY FEES CLAIMED ARE UNREASONABLE
	G. NO SUBSTANTIAL FEE CLAIMS SINCE 2018 ARE WARRANTED
	H. ACCORDING TO NINTH CIRCUIT LAW SUCCESS FEE AGREEMENTS PROVIDING MULTIPLIERS ON FEE SHIFTING CASES ARE NOT ALLOWED
	I. NO COURT HAS EVER GRANTED AN AWARD THAT IS REMOTELY SIMILAR TO THE AMOUNT REQUESTED BY DEFENDANTS
,	J. CALCULATION OF REASONABLE FEE
	III. CONCLUSION
;	
,	
	3:17-CV-04002-LE

Case 3:17-cv-04002-LB Document 78 Filed 03/09/18 Page 3 of 29

1	Cases
2	. Gonzalez v. City of Maywood, 729 F.3d 1196
3	. International Longshoremen's Warehousemen's Union v. Los Angeles Export Terminal, Inc
4	Bernardo v. Planned Parenthood Federation of America, 115 Cal. App. 4th 322
5	Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886
6	Braden v. BH Fin. Servs., Inc., No. C 13-02287 CRB, 2014 WL 892897
7 8	Camacho v. Bridgeport Fin., Inc., 523 F.3d 97316
8 9	Chalmers v. City of Los Angeles, 796 F.2d 120516
10	City of Burlington v. Dague, 120 L. Ed. 2d 449
11	Clejan v. Reisman, 5 Cal. App. 3d 224 16
12	Dove Audio, Inc. v. Rosenfeld, Meyer & Susman, 47 Cal. App. 4th 777
13	Dove Audio, Inc. v. Rosenfeld, Meyer & Susman, 47 Cal. App. 4th 777, 785
14	Dowling v. Zimmerman, 85 Cal. App. 4th 1400
15	Flight Attendants v. Zipes, 491 U.S. 75421
16 17	Gates v. Deukmejian, 987 F.2d 1392 21
'' 18	Henry v. Bank of Am. Corp., No. C 09-0628 RS, 2010 WL 3324890
19	<i>Hensley v. Eckerhart</i> , 461 U.S. 424
20	In re HPL Technologies, Inc. Securities Litigation, 366 F. Supp. 2d 912
21	Kashian v. Harriman, 98 Cal. App. 4th 892 24
22	<i>Ketchum v. Moses</i> , 24 Cal. 4th 1122,
23	LOOP AI LABS INC. v. Gatti, Dist. Court, 5-cv-00798-HSG17
24 25	Loop AI Labs Inc. v. Gatti, Dist. Court, Case No. 15-cv-00798-HSG
∠5 26	<i>Macias v. Hartwell</i> , 55 Cal. App. 4th 669
27	3:17-CV-04002-LB
~~	5:17-CV-04002-LB

²⁸ PLAINTIFFS' OPPOSITION TO DEFENDENT'S MOTION FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES PURSUANT TO CALIFORNIA CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE § 425.16(C)

Case 3:17-cv-04002-LB Document 78 Filed 03/09/18 Page 4 of 29

1	Martino v. Denevi, 182 Cal. App. 3d 553 10
2	Maughan v. Google Technology, Inc., 143 Cal.App.4th 12427
3	Minichino v. First California Realty, No. C-11-5185 EMC, 2012 WL 6554401 8
4	Paul for Council v. Hanyecz, 85 Cal.App.4th 1356
5	<i>Pecot v. Wong</i> , Case No. A139567
6	<i>PLCM Group, Inc v. Drexler</i> , 22 Cal. 4th 1084
7	Rosenaur v. Scherer, 88 Cal. App. 4th 26
8 9	Schroeder v. Irvine City Council, 97 Cal. App. 4th 174
9 10	See Northon v. Rule, 637 F.3d 937
11	Tuchscher Development Enterprises, Inc. v. San Diego Unified Port Dist., 106 Cal. App. 4th 121923
12	Wilkerson v. Sullivan, 99 Cal. App. 4th 443 10
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27	3:17-CV-04002-LB
28	PLAINTIFFS' OPPOSITION TO DEFENDENT'S MOTION FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES PURSUANT TO CALIFORNIA CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE § 425.16(C)

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I.

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

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Plaintiffs are a small business with one employee and three contractors providing a computer 3 security product to a niche market of approximately 40 customers. Unlike Defendant, Plaintiffs did 4 5 not have the means to afford a *dream team* of five attorneys and two support staff from a 5-star law 6 firm, and had to resort to hiring a small law firm with one attorney. Ex. 1, Declaration of Rohit 7 Chhabra (Chhabra Decl.) ¶3. Specifically, Plaintiffs were charged a reasonable hourly rate of 8 \$350/hour since this matter did not relate to any complex issues of Intellectual Property law. Chhabra 9 Decl. ¶¶4, 7. If the Court were to grant Defendant's ridiculous and outrageous fee demands for a 10 relatively simple matter, it would not only be unjustified but would perhaps also fulfill the ultimate 11 objective of Defendant's blog post – to have "the desired effect"¹ of hurting Plaintiffs' business. 12 13 No complex legal question was presented in this matter; specifically no issue related to intellectual 14 property was presented or argued 15

Based on the Court's December 21, 2017 Order, Plaintiffs agreed that Defendant is the 16 prevailing party for the anti-SLAPP motion and statutorily is entitled a reasonable attorneys' fee 17 award. However, Defendant attempts to justify his outrageous fee demand claims and the hiring of a 18 multi-million dollar law firm with specialization in intellectual property law, by stating that the 19 underlying matter in this case was related to a complex legal issue involving intellectual property law. 20 21 **Defendant's contention is patently incorrect.** The underlying premise of Plaintiffs arguments was 22 based on a relatively simple legal argument whether, based on existing case law and American 23 Jurisprudence, Plaintiffs could be held in violation of the GNU General Public License (GPL), and 24 whether Defendant's statements based on his reputation could be considered as offering lay person 25 opinion. See First Amended Complaint (FAC) ¶¶ 30 – 32, 49 (alleging that all the statements are false 26

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¹ See FAC ¶ 45

PLAINTIFFS' OPPOSITION TO DEFENDENT'S MOTION FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES PURSUANT TO CALIFORNIA CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE § 425.16(C)

3:17-CV-04002-LB

Case 3:17-cv-04002-LB Document 78 Filed 03/09/18 Page 6 of 29

because Plaintiffs' Access Agreement did not violate the GPL based on the principle that Plaintiffs had 1 a right to choose their future business patrons); Plaintiffs never presented any argument related to any 2 issue of intellectual property law. See generally, Motion for partial summ. judgment (ECF No. 24); 3 4 Opposition to anti-SLAPP motion (ECF No. 38). Defendant incorrectly states that the FAC asserted 5 complex legal issues. To the contrary, Plaintiffs claimed all nine statements presented by Defendant 6 were false "because the Access Agreement does not violate the GPLv2". FAC ¶49 (emphasis added). 7 Furthermore, neither did this Court find any complex legal issues to make its determination in this 8 matter. See Order Dated Dec. 21. 2017 (ECF No. 53). Plaintiffs' counsel retained Attorneys' fee expert 9 witness William Norman, to provide a fair and unbiased evaluation in this matter. Chhabra Decl. 9. 10 11 No sealed information was provided to Mr. Norman. Id. Neither Plaintiffs, nor Plaintiffs' counsel, or 12 its agents or representatives asked Mr. Norman to modify or revise his assessment. Ex. 2, Declaration 13 of Fee Expert Witness William Norman (Norman Decl.) ¶ 2; Chhabra Decl.¶ 9. Mr. Norman has 47 14 years of experience, has handled several complex business litigation matters, including approximately 15 15 anti-SLAPP matters; he has also appeared as an attorneys' fee expert on several occasions. Norman 16 Decl. ¶1. A true and correct copy of Mr. Norman's publicly available experience and professional 17 biography is attached hereto as Ex. $3.^2$ 18

Mr. Norman also agrees with Plaintiffs' contention that nothing in this matter required a huge
law firm with attorneys specializing in Intellectual Property matters; there was no need to hire an
intellectual property based legal team with their exorbitant hourly rates. Norman Decl. ¶ 6. However,
despite that, Defendant under seal submits Detailed Billing Entries (ECF No. 67 (Hansen Decl.), Ex.
C) (Timekeeper Records) and demands \$478,977.50 in attorneys' fees and an additional award of
\$188,687.75 as a "success fee." Decl. Hansen ¶4. Not only does the demanded fee show inefficient

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3:17-CV-04002-LB

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^{27 &}lt;sup>2</sup> available at: <u>http://www.cwclaw.com/attorneys/attorneyBio.aspx?name=WilliamNorman</u>

PLAINTIFFS' OPPOSITION TO DEFENDENT'S MOTION FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES PURSUANT TO CALIFORNIA CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE § 425.16(C)

Case 3:17-cv-04002-LB Document 78 Filed 03/09/18 Page 7 of 29

management, Defendant mistakes and forgets the legislative purpose of Code of Civil Procedure § 1 425.16(C) is to entitle recovery of reasonable attorneys' fees and costs, and not to unjustly enrich his 2 3 counsels with outrageous and unfettered attorneys' fees or unconscionable alternative fee agreements 4 like "success fees." Both are unreasonable and appalling by any standard for determining attorney's 5 fees and costs in this matter. Norman Decl. ¶ 7, 10. 6 Exorbitant and unreasonable hourly attorney billing rates 7 Defendant also seeks recovery of fees based on hourly fee charges that exceed by hundreds of 8 dollars per hour the average billing rates charged in the relevant legal community. Not only is 9 Defendant's *dream team* overstaffed, their billing rates claimed can only be considered reasonable in 10 11 ones' dream! Notably, all three associates who worked on this matter were admitted in California in 12 2017; two claimed "associates" were not even attorneys (in any jurisdiction) until December 2, 13 2017 – that is, 12 days before the Dec. 14 hearing in this matter. Chhabra Decl. ¶ 10. It is patently 14 unreasonable to bill out a paralegal at two non-attorney "interns" at (for less than 15 a month, ignoring December holidays, and then interestingly enough increasing their hourly rates to 16), a first year associate from in 2017 to in 2018, and two partners each 17 and /hour for 2017 and 2018 respectively. It is billed at and , and 18 19 astonishing that even Defendant's paralegal has a claimed hourly billable higher that Plaintiffs' 20 counsel; this is completely unheard of, even in matters involving complex intellectual property (patent) 21 related issues. This further becomes extremely outrageous since Plaintiffs never argued any complex 22 legal question in this matter related to a complex intellectual property issue. It is also problematic that 23 Defendant argues that he needed to hire a multi-million dollar intellectual law firm because Plaintiffs 24 sought to recover 3 Million dollars in damages from an individual. This is incorrect. Complaints are 25 routinely filed based on information and belief, and Plaintiffs sought a recovery of 3 Million dollars in 26 27 damages from Defendant and Does 1 -50 (a total of 51 defendants). Since discovery was never -3-28 3:17-CV-04002-LB PLAINTIFFS' OPPOSITION TO DEFENDENT'S MOTION FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES PURSUANT TO CALIFORNIA CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE § 425.16(C)

Case 3:17-cv-04002-LB Document 78 Filed 03/09/18 Page 8 of 29

initiated, Plaintiffs were never able to ascertain the correct number of defendants in this matter.
Specifically, Plaintiffs sought damages of "an amount *to be determined at trial*, but in excess of
\$75,000 as to each defendant." FAC ¶ 86 (italics added). Thus, this also does not justify Defendant's
imprudent actions of hiring a multi-million dollar law firm with specialization in intellectual property
law. Further, Plaintiffs also cannot be held responsible for Defendant's counsel's actions for
undertaking this non-intellectual property matter, when this matter could have easily been represented
by any non-intellectual property lawyer. *See* Norman Decl. ¶ 6.

9 Serious Mismanagement Concerns

The unreasonableness and the inefficiency can also be recognized by Defendant's counsel's
having assigned seven different time billers to the matter, including two partners, two non-admitted
"associates" (legal interns) and a first year associate to the defense of this matter. As opined by
attorneys' fee expert, Mr. Norman, "[m]ore timekeepers, especially those duplicating other
timekeepers in the same levels, are extremely inefficient. Confusion, extra management time by the
team leader, and excess intra-office conferencing result in greater cost and they often compromise the
overall effort." Norman Decl. ¶ 7(b).

Furthermore, given the fact that 82%³ of the billable hours involved work performed by nonadmitted "interns" and a first year associate, the outrageous and absurd character of Defendant's
demands can be recognized by determining a per page attorneys' fee charged:

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- 137. 9 hours for a 23 page First Anti-SLAPP Motion plus accompanying one page declaration totaling \$83,606.50 (\$3,463 per page);
- 77.6 hours for a mostly duplicative *24 page* Second anti-SLAPP motion and accompanying one page declaration totaling \$43,669.50 (**\$1,746.78 per page**);
- 25 26
- 27

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³ See Def. Motion' for Attys' fees at 13:9

PLAINTIFFS' OPPOSITION TO DEFENDENT'S MOTION FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES PURSUANT TO CALIFORNIA CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE § 425.16(C)

3:17-CV-04002-LB

Case 3:17-cv-04002-LB Document 78 Filed 03/09/18 Page 9 of 29

1	•	109.5 hours for a 15 page reply for the Second anti-SLAPP totaling \$60,803.50
2		<u>(\$4,053 per page);</u>
3	•	19.6 hours for a 3 page Response to Plaintiff's supplemental brief totaling \$10,798.50
4		<u>(\$3,599 per page);</u>
5	•	87.5 hours for a 10 page opposition to partial summary judgment with one page
6		declaration totaling \$49, 813 (\$4,528 per page);
7 8	•	29.2 hours for a 6 page motions for Surreply and Surreply to partial summary
о 9		judgment totaling \$17,477 (\$2,912 per page);
10	•	131.8 hours for a 19 page motion for attorneys' fees, a 7 page declaration, and a 28
11		page expense report (totaling 59 pages) for \$76,602 (\$1,298 per page).
12	Other o	outrageous fees claimed by Defendant are:
13	•	141.6 hours for preparing for a Court hearing; needlessly involving excessive staff who
14 15		played no active role in the hearing;
15 16	•	86.9 hours claimed by Defendant's counsel for case management; and
17	•	12.3 hours for three settlement communications via email (see Decl. Chhabra ¶ 11);
18		and
19	•	\$188,167.75 unconscionable success fee that should be denied. Ninth Circuit law
20		specifically prohibits success fee multipliers in statutory fee shifting awards, as
21		discussed further herein.
22	Indeed	Defendant's lead counsel, Ms. Hansen, throughout her litigation career of more than a
23 24		cessfully defended clients in defamation actions. ⁴ Decl. Hansen \P 9. Therefore, with
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26	$\frac{4}{4}$ An attorney y	who has defended defamation claims through the course of her decade long litigation
27	career should r	easonably know how to efficiently draft anti-SLAPP motions.
28		-5- 3:17-CV-04002-LB
		PPOSITION TO DEFENDENT'S MOTION FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES PURSUANT TO CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE § 425.16(C)

Case 3:17-cv-04002-LB Document 78 Filed 03/09/18 Page 10 of 29

more than a decade of experience defendant clients in defamation actions, she should have reasonably
 exercised proper judgment and should have steered her inexperienced interns and first year associate in
 a manner that would have significantly reduced the needless hours of research and reviews performed
 by all three junior unexperienced researchers and motion drafters.

Even Plaintiffs' counsel, with no prior experience in defamation cases (but otherwise not new
to addressing complex litigation matters), has been significantly more efficient than Defendant's *dream team* by singlehandedly addressing this matter, without any support staff, and by billing
Plaintiffs a total of \$80,175, for the entirety of this matter, representing 229 billable hours. Chhabra
Decl. ¶ 5. In fact, Plaintiffs' counsel has not billed Plaintiffs more than 40 hours (generally less) for
any motion or pleading, illustrating that there was no need for significant research of any complex
legal issue. Chhabra Decl. ¶ 7.

Therefore, the question now presented to the Court is – If Plaintiffs' counsel, with no prior
 experience in addressing defamation cases, was able to provide efficient representation to his clients,
 why couldn't Defendant's counsel do the same for handling a substantially similar amount of work?
 Arguably, had Plaintiffs' counsel employed interns and junior associates, the fee charged to Plaintiffs
 would have been further lowered. Clearly, Defendant has failed to provide substantial evidence
 justifying such egregious mismanagement that warrants 8.5 times the amount Plaintiffs' were charged
 for handling the same work.

21 Respectfully, there can be no reasonable justification. While Ms. Hansen has not claimed she 22 has "significant experience" in handling defamation cases, a decade long career of defending 23 defamation cases is nothing less than substantial and impressive; it is enough to provide efficient 24 management skills. The Court should therefore consider her experience, the number of hours expended 25 by Plaintiffs' counsel, declaration of fee expert, Mr. Norman, and the Court's own expertise and 26 27 experience in addressing similar actions to determine a reasonable fee award. See Maughan v. Google -6-28 3:17-CV-04002-LB PLAINTIFFS' OPPOSITION TO DEFENDENT'S MOTION FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES PURSUANT TO CALIFORNIA

CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE § 425.16(C)

Case 3:17-cv-04002-LB Document 78 Filed 03/09/18 Page 11 of 29

Technology, Inc., 143 Cal.App.4th 1242, 1248-1251, 1253 (2006) ("the court determining based on its 1 own experience and expertise in handling complex civil cases, reduced a \$112,288.63 anti-SLAPP fee 2 claim to \$23,000 by reducing the claimed hours on the SLAPP motion from over 200 hours to 50 hours 3 4 and further considering the attorney's experience handling such matters.); *Pecot v. Wong*, Case No. 5 A139566, at *3, (Cal. Court of Appeal, 1st Appellate Dist., 4th Div., Jan. 18, 2018) WL 6 (unpublished) (affirming a reduction of anti-SLAPP fee claim for approximately 159 claimed hours to 7 \$20,000 by reducing the number of hours and determining a reasonable fee, based on the court's own 8 expertise and experience and considering fee expert witness testimony). 9

Furthermore, as explained below, 48% of the detailed Timekeeping Records have substantial
 miscalculations, showing inconsistent billing practices, and cannot be considered as a reliable source
 of evidence. Thus, Defendant cannot satisfy his burden and establish that the claimed charges are
 reasonable.

In order to assist the Court, Plaintiffs undertook the mammoth project of providing a detailed
 analysis of the Timekeeping Records, calculations (including corrections of the 48% errors), and
 determining a reasonable fee award along with the basis thereof, as discussed further below.

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II.

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<u>THE COSTS AND FEES DEFENDANTS REQUEST IN THEIR EXPENSE REPORT</u> <u>ARE UNREASONABLE, EXCESSIVE, AND UNNECESSARY</u>

20 State law governs attorney's fees awards based on state fee-shifting laws, like California's anti-21 SLAPP statute. See Northon v. Rule, 637 F.3d 937, 938 (9th Cir.2011). The Northern District has 22 recognized that a prevailing defendant, under section 425.16(c), shall only be entitled to recover 23 24 attorney's fees and costs that a court deems are reasonable. Loop AI Labs Inc. v. Gatti, Dist. Court, 25 Case No. 15-cv-00798-HSG at *2 (N.D. Cal. May 9, 2016) (citing Minichino v. First California 26 Realty, No. C-11-5185 EMC, 2012 WL 6554401, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 14, 2012)); Robertson v. 27 -7-28 3:17-CV-04002-LB *Rodriguez*, 36 Cal. App. 4th 347,362 (1995); *Dove Audio, Inc. v. Rosenfeld, Meyer & Susman*, 47 Cal.
 App. 4th 777, 785 (1996).

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3	The proper method for calculating attorney's fees in California is the lodestar method. See			
4	Ketchum v. Moses, 24 Cal. 4th 1122, 1136 (2001). In assessing attorney's fees under this method,			
5	however, a Court must exclude those fees that are "excessive, redundant, [and] otherwise			
6	unnecessary." Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 434 (1983); see also Serrano v Priest, 20 Cal 3d 25,			
7	48 (1997) (explaining that a court assessing attorney fees begins with a lodestar figure that is based on			
8	the "careful compilation of the time spent and reasonable hourly compensation of each attorney			
9	involved in the presentation of the case.")			
10	involved in the presentation of the case.)			
11	Since the Court's "role is not merely to rubber stamp the defendant's request, but to ascertain			
12	whether the amount sought is reasonable," Robertson at 361, any fee award must be established by			
13	"substantial evidence" supporting the award. Macias v. Hartwell, 55 Cal. App. 4th 669, 676 (1997).			
14	Therefore, the Court is "not bound by the amount sought by defendants and [has the] discretion to			
15	award them a lesser sum." <i>Robertson</i> at 362. Because Defendant requests an award that is			
16	award them a resser sum. <i>Robertson</i> at 502. Because Defendant requests an award that is			
17	unreasonable and excessive, Defendant's request for attorney's fees and costs must be substantially			
18	reduced.			
19	A. A SUBSTANTIAL PORTION OF THE FEES AND COSTS SUBMITTED BY DEFENDANT			
20	IS NOT RECOVERABLE UNDER § 425.16(C) Defendant presumes that he only had the right to file an anti-SLAPP motion and that no other			
21	motion could (or should) have been filed prior to the hearing of the anti-SLAPP motion. See Mot. Atty.			
22				
23	Fees' at 3-4. However, Defendant fails to provide any case law that supports his contention.			
24	The motion for partial summary judgment arose out of the facts based on statements made by			
25	Defendant – prior to the filing of the anti-SLAPP motion(s). Even if Defendant had not filed his anti-			
26	SLAPP motion, Plaintiffs would have filed the motion for partial summary judgment based on the			
27	Defendant's prior statement, since an issue of fact existed that reasonably questioned Defendant's			
28	-8- 3:17-CV-04002-LB			
	PLAINTIFFS' OPPOSITION TO DEFENDENT'S MOTION FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES PURSUANT TO CALIFORNIA CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE § 425.16(C)			

Case 3:17-cv-04002-LB Document 78 Filed 03/09/18 Page 13 of 29

belief in the truth of his statements presented in the blog post. See Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment ("MPSJ") (ECF No. 24). And since complaints are regularly filed on belief and information,
these statements provided a showing that Defendant agreed with Plaintiffs, and thus there was no
genuine issue of fact. Indeed, Plaintiffs had an arguable legal theory and wanted to debate that matter
first before the filing of the Second anti-SLAPP motion; had the Court agreed with Plaintiffs, there
would have been no need to file the Second anti-SLAPP motion. See Norman Decl. ¶8.

California's Anti-SLAPP statute allows a movant to recover "only those fees and costs incurred 8 in connection with the motion to strike, not the entire action." Paul for Council v. Hanyecz, 85 9 Cal.App.4th 1356 (2001). Plaintiffs, therefore, are not responsible to pay any fees that are applicable to 10 11 non-SLAPP motion matters or both the anti-SLAPP motion and other aspects of the litigation. The 12 statute limits recovery to costs and fees that apply only to the motion to strike and this is clearly a rule 13 of reason insofar as the purpose of an attorney's fees award under § 425. 16(c) is to compensate 14 defendants for the additional cost of litigating the anti-SLAPP motion. Insofar, as research would have 15 necessarily been performed were the anti-SLAPP motion never filed, Defendant should not be able to 16 recover those fees as well. Nonetheless, Defendant attempts to subsume all research relevant to both 17 the SLAPP motion and other aspects of the litigation even though that research would have needed to 18 19 be performed regardless of whether the anti-SLAPP motion had been filed. 20 However, even if the Court were to disagree with Plaintiffs' contention, there was a substantial 21 duplication in the arguments presented in the anti-SLAPP motion and MPSJ; attorneys' fees to file

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 those additional motions should have been minimal. Norman Decl. ¶8.
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B. 48% OF THE TIMEKEEPING RECORDS HAVE "DOCTORED" FEES AND/OR HOURS CLAIMS AND CANNOT BE CONSIDERED AS A RELIABLE SOURCE; NEITHER CAN ANY DECLARATION BE CONSIDERED RELIABLE THAT IS BASED ON THE ERRONEOUS TIMEKEEPING RECORDS

Attorneys are required to "maintain accurate records of work done and time spent in preparing each client's case" as "a detailed billing record gains the advantage of being able to evaluate the worth

each client's case" as "a detailed billing record gains the advantage of being able to evaluate the worth

3:17-CV-04002-LB PLAINTIFFS' OPPOSITION TO DEFENDENT'S MOTION FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES PURSUANT TO CALIFORNIA CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE § 425.16(C)

Case 3:17-cv-04002-LB Document 78 Filed 03/09/18 Page 14 of 29

of the services provided." *Martino v. Denevi*, 182 Cal. App. 3d 553, 558 (1986). Even though
testimony by any attorney regarding the number of hours worked is sufficient to justify that it is
appropriate to grant attorney's fees, the reasonable value of the services rendered is still at the
discretion of the Court. *Id.* at 558-59; see also *Wilkerson v. Sullivan*, 99 Cal. App. 4th 443, 448 (2002)
(explaining that "[t]he reasonableness of attorney fees is within the discretion of the trial court.")

6 Although Defendant's counsel submits under declaration that the timekeeping records were 7 contemporaneously maintained (Def. Fee Motion, 9: 21 -23; Hansen Decl. ¶20 - 27), and personally 8 reviewed the records of fees and costs (Hansen Decl. $\P 2, 26$), approximately $48\%^5$ of the records 9 have incorrect mathematical calculations by either presenting exaggerated hours claimed with 10 11 substantially less fee listed, or by presenting exaggerated fees claimed for substantially less hours 12 listed. Decl. Chhabra ¶ 13. With so many disparities one can reasonably infer that the Timekeeping 13 Records are "doctored" for the sole purpose of meeting the purported amount and hours being claimed. 14 Not only the number of hours and fees claimed for which Defendant seeks reimbursement is absurd, 15 with 48% records reflecting incorrect calculations, the truthfulness and veracity of the Timekeeping 16 Records, in its entirety, and any supporting Declaration therewith are justifiably questioned;⁶ it is 17 respectfully submitted the Timekeeper Records cannot be considered as trustworthy evidence, and thus 18 19 any accompanying declaration relying on the Timekeeper Records should be stricken.

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
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^{22&}lt;sup>5</sup> 240 out of 502 records, excluding records related to sanctions.

⁶ But of course Defendant's counsel is going to claim the 48% inaccuracies were an administrative "mistake," even after submitting a declaration, under penalty of perjury, that she reviewed "each of the billing records." However, it is improbable that a 700+ million dollar law firm like O'Melveny would not even have the most primitive timekeeping software that can perform simple mathematical calculations. Furthermore, with seven resources working on this matter (out of which five are (now) attorneys), it is hard to believe this could be an "honest mistake." It can reasonably be inferred that Defendant's counsel intentionally presented inaccurate data (both in hours and time) to greatly

exaggerate either the fee or hours claimed per task, while burying this data in a 7-point font in an
 attempt to justify their unreasonable and outrageous fee claims.

Case 3:17-cv-04002-LB Document 78 Filed 03/09/18 Page 15 of 29



Case 3:17-cv-04002-LB Document 78 Filed 03/09/18 Page 16 of 29

However, in good faith, Plaintiffs have corrected the claimed fees/ hours and summarized/
 sorted them by "category," for the Court's convenience. *Id*.

Based on the corrected calculations Defendant's counsels' own timekeeping records indicate
that the total inefficient and mismanaged hours they are in fact claiming is 642.3 hours, that is a
reduction of 191.6 hours from the 833.9 hours claimed in Defendant's motion. Decl. Chhabra, Ex. 1-A.
While Plaintiffs recognize that California does not require contemporaneously maintained records, and
usually attorneys' declaration suffices for a fee motion, under the best evidence rule, any disparity and
deviation in Defendant's counsel's declaration, from the contemporaneously maintained records,
should be stricken out from such declaration.

11 Furthermore, with 48% errors, a question now exists as to the truthfulness and veracity of all 12 the Timekeeping Records submitted by Defendant's counsels. Also, any attempt to provide "corrected" 13 Timekeeping Records questions the premise of maintaining "contemporaneous" records and 14 submitting them as proof. Therefore, Defendant has failed to provide sufficient information to 15 determine whether the time spent and billed for various activities was, or was not, reasonable. With 16 48% of the timekeeping record not matching their claimed fees, it is fair to conclude Defendant's 17 counsels have not maintained proper records and thus Defendant's counsels have failed to establish by 18 19 "substantial evidence" supporting the award claimed. Macias v. Hartwell, supra, at 676. On these 20 grounds, this motion should be dismissed with prejudice; however, at the very least the 21 contemporaneous Timekeeping Records, and Ms. Hansen's declaration cannot and should not be 22 considered trustworthy and should be stricken from record. 23 C. THE TIMEKEEPING RECORDS HAVE AMBIGUOUS OR INCOMPLETE 24 INFORMATION Furthermore, Defendant's Timekeeping Records are filled with incomplete and ambiguous 25 information such that it is impossible to determine whether or not a particular expense is for purposes 26 27 of the anti-SLAPP motion or training exercises for its junior associate and interns. The descriptions of -12-28 3:17-CV-04002-LB

PLAINTIFFS' OPPOSITION TO DEFENDENT'S MOTION FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES PURSUANT TO CALIFORNIA CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE § 425.16(C)

Case 3:17-cv-04002-LB Document 78 Filed 03/09/18 Page 17 of 29

1	the Timekeeping Records do not provide any guidance whatsoever in determining whether a			
2	reasonable amount of time was spent on that activity. For most records, other than claiming that an			
3	activity for a motion was performed, there is no detail as to what specific portion of that activity was			
4	conducted. For example, there are numerous ambiguous expenses and duplicative entries related to:			
5	a. 23 entries, excluding "sanctions" entries, related to "Conducting Legal Research" for a			
6	motion, "Conduct Additional Research," "Conduct Supplemental Research," and "Conduct related			
7	research" (and other variants) for a motion without providing anything more;			
8	b. 107 entries, excluding "sanctions" entries, including conference, confer, or discussions, or			
9 10	additional conferences regarding a motion without providing more; and			
11	c. 188 entries, excluding "sanctions" entries, related to revising or drafting a motion.			
12	Decl. Chhabra ¶ 14.			
13	Because the non-descript or ambiguous and duplicative billing expenses make it impossible to			
14				
15	determine whether the time spent on those activities is reasonable, Plaintiffs cannot be obligated to pay			
16	for those expenses.			
17	D. DUPLICATIVE, EXCESSIVE, IRRELEVANT AND INEFFICIENT PRACTICES			
18	Counsels for Defendant are obligated to "make a good faith effort" to deduct from its			
19	Timekeeping Record and Expense Report all "hours that are excessive, redundant, or otherwise			
20	unnecessary, just as a lawyer in private practice ethically is obligated to exclude such hours from his			
21	fee submission." Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434; see also Ketchum, 24 Cal. 4th at 1132 (holding that			
22	"padding' in the form of inefficient or duplicative efforts is not subject to compensation.") However,			
23	the record indicates Defendant's counsel has not done so. As illustrated numerous above, numerous			
24 25	duplicative and ambiguous records prevent reasonable time determinations.			
25 26	However, 49 entries that do provide detailed research analysis performed. Decl. Chhabr Ex. 1-			
26 27				
27	M. Those records highlight the duplication, inefficiency, and irrelevancy, which further reflects Ms. -13-			
28	3:17-CV-04002-LB PLAINTIFFS' OPPOSITION TO DEFENDENT'S MOTION FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES PURSUANT TO CALIFORNIA CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE § 425.16(C)			

Case 3:17-cv-04002-LB Document 78 Filed 03/09/18 Page 18 of 29

Hansen's mismanagement in this matter (providing detailed objections on all the records). A few
 examples are:

3	1. C. Gagliano conducted "
4	on 10/3/17 – 10/5/17 and claimed hours. Furthermore, if
5	Defendant claims the first record of 10/3, highlighted in red, was a genuine mathematical error (and
6	should have instead been hours to justify the claimed \$, then the total changes to hours
7	of "research" to determine on a pending anti-SLAPP motion.
8	2. C. Gagliano spent hours to "
9	
10	" on 1/27/18 – 1/29/18 claiming Plaintiffs wonder what
11	sort of "warranted hours.
12	3. M. Rhoades spent only to discover L.R. 79-5, on 1/23/18. Also,
13	the Court's well written webpage on sealing documents shows up as the first link on Google when
14 15	searching for "e-file under seal northern district."
15 16	These are just a few of the outrageous examples; a complete list of research activity (where
17	details were provided in Timekeeping Records) and objections thereto are provided at Chhabra Decl.
18	Ex. 1-A to 1-M. In sum, just for "research" Defendant's dream team claimed (without corrections)
19	hours: Fee: fee: fee: fee: fee: fee: fee: fee
20	irrelevant, duplicative and/or inefficient research. Decl. Chhabra Ex. 1-M.
21	Plaintiffs cannot be held responsible for such inefficiencies.
22	E. MOTION DRAFTING: TIME SPENT DRAFTING, REVISING, CONFERRING AND
23	RESEARCHING THE MOTIONS WAS EXCESSIVE For the Court's convenience, Plaintiffs have compiled and sorted the Timekeeping records by
24	motion, and also provided corrected calculations, where necessary, to illustrate the unreasonableness
25	
26	and exorbitant fees/hours claimed by Defendant in this matter along with a basis of objection. See Decl
27	Chhabra Ex. 1-A through 1-M. -14-
28	3:17-CV-04002-LB
	PLAINTIFFS' OPPOSITION TO DEFENDENT'S MOTION FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES PURSUANT TO CALIFORNIA CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE § 425.16(C)

Case 3:17-cv-04002-LB Document 78 Filed 03/09/18 Page 19 of 29

1	As can be observed, predominantly all entries state 'performing research', 'motion drafting', or				
2	'conferences', and are repeated numerous times. Further, these entries have numerous errors,				
3	inconsistent billing calculations, and are irrelevant, duplicative, or simply show inefficiency. All				
4	objections are stated in the extreme right column of each entry.				
5	Since no complex intellectual property claim was asserted, see FAC ¶ 49 (stating that all				
6	statements in Defendant's blog were false because Plaintiffs did not violate the GPL). Also see FAC ¶¶				
7 8	21, 22, 30 and 31 (explaining the basis of why Plaintiffs claimed that they did not violate the GPL).				
9	However, 33.3 hours were spent for researching this issue, without proper guidance to a first year				
10	associate. Defendant provides no justification why there has been extreme inefficiency, especially				
11	when no complex legal issue was presented.				
12	In sum, since Ms. Hansen has over a decade of litigation experience and has handled several				
13	defamation matters (Decl. Hansen ¶ 9), she could have easily prevented such frivolous and needless				
14	research and actions. Plaintiffs cannot be held liable for a training school created by O'Melveny's				
15	attorneys.				
16 17	F. HOURLY FEES CLAIMED ARE UNREASONABLE				
18	"In determining a reasonable hourly rate, the district court should be guided by the rate				
19	prevailing in the community for similar work performed by attorneys of comparable skill, experience,				
20	and reputation." Chalmers v. City of Los Angeles, 796 F.2d 1205, 1210-11 (9th Cir. 1986) (citing Blum				
21	v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895 n.11). The relevant community for purposes of determining the				
22	prevailing market rate is generally the "forum in which the district court sits." <i>Camacho v. Bridgeport</i>				
23	<i>Fin., Inc.</i> , 523 F.3d 973, 979 (9th Cir. 2008).				
24					
25	In determining the reasonableness of Defendant's counsel's fees, this Court must weigh several				
26	factors including the attorney's skill required and employed in handling the matter, the attorney's				
27	learning, and the attorney's experience in the particular type of work. <i>Clejan v. Reisman</i> , 5 Cal. App. -15-				
28	3:17-CV-04002-LB PLAINTIFFS' OPPOSITION TO DEFENDENT'S MOTION FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES PURSUANT TO CALIFORNIA CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE § 425.16(C)				

Case 3:17-cv-04002-LB Document 78 Filed 03/09/18 Page 20 of 29

3d 224, 241 (1970). The lodestar approach begins by multiplying "the numbers of hours <u>reasonably</u>
expended [with the] <u>reasonable hourly rate</u>." *PLCM Group, Inc v. Drexler*, 22 Cal. 4th 1084, 1095
(2000) (emphasis added). In so doing, a court should use the prevailing rates of comparable private
attorneys as the "touchstone" for determining a reasonable rate for an attorney. *International Longshoremen's Warehousemen's Union v. Los Angeles Export Terminal, Inc.*, 69 Cal. App. 4th 287,
303 (1999).

Notwithstanding Defendant's claims to the contrary, O'Melveny's hourly billing rate for its
 attorneys and support staff is outrageous. O'Melveny staffed this case with seven individuals
 representing six different billing rates ranging from and and the se billing
 rates are in excess of the normal prevailing rate for attorneys practicing in San Francisco Bay Area,
 California, including Menlo Park and San Francisco and also exceeds the experience and similar
 expertise in this type of litigation. Norman Decl. ¶¶1, 2, and 7(a).

14 It is respectfully submitted, Defendant cannot provide any reasonable justification why
15 intellectual property attorneys from a huge law firm were selected to represent him in this matter, and
17 thus his counsel's fee should be adjusted accordingly.⁸

Mr. Norman has provided estimated maximum hourly rates based on the complexity in this
 matter ranging from \$180 to \$550 per hour. Norman Decl. ¶7(a). In fact, Mr. Norman's estimated
 hourly rates exceed those that have been approved and recognized by various courts discussing similar,
 if not more, complex legal issues, in the Northern District. *See LOOP AI LABS INC. v. Gatti, Dist. Court, 5-cv-00798-HSG* (finding that the requested hourly rates of \$230 for associates having four
 years experience, \$365 per hour for attorney with 16 years of experience in complex intellectual

- ⁸ Plaintiffs' counsel, while primarily an intellectual property attorney, offered a discounted hourly rate to Plaintiffs in this matter (and has since maintained the same rate) as it was reasonably determined that this was not going to be an intellectual property related matter. See Chhabra Decl. ___.
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3:17-CV-04002-LB

-16-

Case 3:17-cv-04002-LB Document 78 Filed 03/09/18 Page 21 of 29

property litigation matters, and \$440 per hour for a partner with are reasonable are within the range of 1 reasonable rates in the Northern District [of California]); citing Henry v. Bank of Am. Corp., No. C 09-2 3 0628 RS, 2010 WL 3324890, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 23, 2010) (approving rates of \$225 per hour for an 4 associate and \$515 per hour for the partner); *Minichino*, 2012 WL 6554401, at *5 (finding attorneys 5 with nine and fourteen years of experience reasonably had billing rates ranging from \$450-555); 6 Braden v. BH Fin. Servs., Inc., No. C 13-02287 CRB, 2014 WL 892897, at *6-7 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 4, 7 2014) (approving rates of \$610 per hour for partners, and \$310 per hour for managing attorney with 8 over eight years of experience)). 9

Furthermore, even if this is considered as a complex matter, Mr. Norman's expert testimony as 10 to the prevailing rate for a Bay area attorney are comparable to the Laffey Matrix, when adjusted to the 11 12 Bay area, which are a widely recognized compilation of attorney and paralegal rate data which is 13 regularly prepared and updated by the Civil Division of the United States Attorney's Office for the 14 District of Columbia and used in fee shifting cases in complex litigation matters and frequently 15 accepted by the Northern District. See https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/file/796471/download (last 16 visited March 7, 2018).⁹ As noted by former Chief Judge Walker of this Court, "adjusting the Laffey 17 matrix figures upward by approximately 9% will yield rates appropriate for the Bay area" by using the 18 19 locality pay differentials within the federal courts as a reference. In re HPL Technologies, Inc. 20 Securities Litigation, 366 F. Supp. 2d 912, 922 (N.D. Cal. 2005) (determining the Laffey Matrix as a 21 "well-established objective source for rates" and finding it adequate for a complex securities fraud 22 class action). 23

- 20
- 24
- 25 Laffey Matrix, adjusted to the Bay area as an accurate prevailing rate. *Lane Zhao v. SuminTsai*, 17-cv-

⁹ A true and correct copy is attached hereto. Chhabra Decl. ¶ 15, Ex. 4

In fact, as late as last month Chief Magistrate Judge Hon. Joseph C. Spero recognized the

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3:17-CV-04002-LB

PLAINTIFFS' OPPOSITION TO DEFENDENT'S MOTION FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES PURSUANT TO CALIFORNIA CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE § 425.16(C)

Case 3:17-cv-04002-LB Document 78 Filed 03/09/18 Page 22 of 29

1 07378-JCS (N.D. Cal, Feb. 2018); Also see *Brinker v. Normandin's* 14-cv-03007-EJD (HRL) (N.D.
2 Cal., Feb 2017); *Garcia v. Stanley*, 14-cv-01806-BLF, (N.D. Cal. March 2017) (finding an hourly rate
3 of \$500/hour in the San Francisco Bay area reasonable when the Laffey Matrix provides a reference
4 range of from \$608 to \$747 per hour) (citing *In re HPL Technologies, Inc. Securities Litigation,*5 *supra*). Plaintiffs confirm, according to the locality pay differentials within the federal courts, Judge
6 Walker's assessment of approximately 9% upwards differential for the Bay area remains correct as of
7 today. Decl. Chhabra ¶ 16, Ex. 5, 6.

9 The following table shows the comparable rates between Mr. Norman's unbiased assessment
10 and the adjusted Laffey Matrix. Further, since a substantial amount of work in this matter was
11 performed in 2017 (with the exception of the fees motion itself), using the Laffey Matrix of 201612 2017, provides an adequate reference point to determine the prevalent rate, even if this matter is
13 considered as a complex legal matter:

14				
15	Experience	Per hour rates 2016-2017 (Laffey)	Per hour rates 2016- 2017 (Laffey adjusted	Mr. Norman's estimated hourly fee for this matter
16			9% for San Francisco Bay Area)	based on its complexity (See Norman Decl. 7(a))
17	21-30 years experience	\$543	\$591	\$475 - \$550
18	11-15 years experience	\$465	\$507	\$425 - \$450
19 00	Less than 2 years experience	\$291	\$317	\$230 - \$240
20 21	Less than 1 year experience	\$240 ¹⁰	\$261	\$210 - \$215
22	Law Clerk/ non- admitted	\$157 ¹¹	\$171	\$180 - \$195
23	Paralegal	\$157	\$171	\$190 - \$220

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-18-

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3:17-CV-04002-LB

 ¹⁰ No data is provided for an associate with less than 1 year experience in the Laffey Matrix (for a complex litigation matter), but a good faith estimate is provided based on Mr. Norman's estimated maximum for a relatively simple matter.

^{27 &}lt;sup>11</sup> See Laffey Matrix fn.6, attorney not admitted to bar compensated at "Paralegals & Law Clerks" rate.

Case 3:17-cv-04002-LB Document 78 Filed 03/09/18 Page 23 of 29

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2	It should be noted that while the Laffey Matrix is generally considered as an average fee for				
3	complex litigation, Mr. Norman has not determined this matter to be a complex issue and thus his fee				
4	estimates are understandably lower than the rates displayed in the Laffey Matrix. Thus, Plaintiffs				
5	request this Court to consider Mr. Norman's hourly rate assessment as more accurate than the Laffey				
6	Matrix. Nonetheless, the above, provides substantial evidence that any attorney hourly rate				
7	determination higher than the adjusted Laffey Matrix in this matter should be considered as				
8 9	unwarranted.				
10	G. NO SUBSTANTIAL FEE CLAIMS SINCE 2018 ARE WARRANTED				
11	Defendant's counsels claim to have substantially worked on this matter in 2018. Specifically,				
12	Defendant's counsels claim to have expended H. Meeker (hours); M. Hansen (hours); C.				
13 14	Gagliano (hours); E. Ormsby (hours); M. Rhoades (hours). However, except for three				
14 15	terse email communications, Plaintiffs have not communicated with Defendant (except when directed				
16	by the Court on January 18, 2018). Chhabra Decl. ¶ 11. Thus, except for the fees motion the Court				
17	should strike any hours claimed by Defendant. Moreover, the demonstrated inefficiency and				
18	duplicative work performed by Defendant's counsels existed throughout this matter, and therefore the				
19 20	hours claimed are unjustified				
21	H. ACCORDING TO NINTH CIRCUIT LAW SUCCESS FEE AGREEMENTS PROVIDING				
22	<u>MULTIPLIERS ON FEE SHIFTING CASES ARE NOT ALLOWED</u> In Federal Court, contingency multipliers are not allowed in fee shifting cases. <i>See Gates v.</i>				
23	Deukmejian, 987 F.2d 1392 (9th Cir. 1992). In Gates, the court, in declining to apply a multiplier on a				
24	contingency case in the fee shifting context stated:				
25					
26	In <i>Dague</i> the Supreme Court addressed whether, in determining an award of attorney's fees				
27	6972(e), or section 505(d) of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 86 Stat. 889, as amended, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(d), a court "may enhance the fee above the 'lodestar' amount in				
28	-19-				
	3:17-CV-04002-LE PLAINTIFFS' OPPOSITION TO DEFENDENT'S MOTION FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES PURSUANT TO CALIFORNIA CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE § 425.16(C)				

Case 3:17-cv-04002-LB Document 78 Filed 03/09/18 Page 24 of 29

order to reflect the fact that the party's attorneys were retained on a contingent-fee [**31] basis 1 and thus assumed the risk of receiving no payment at all for their services. City of Burlington v. Dague, 120 L. Ed. 2d 449, 112 S. Ct. 2638, 2639 (1992). 2 In its June 24, 1992 opinion in *Dague* the Court answered this query with a resounding "no," 3 when it held "that enhancement for contingency is not permitted under the fee shifting 4 statutes." Id. at 2643-44. Although the Solid Waste Disposal and Federal Water Pollution Control Acts and not § 1988 were at issue in Dague, the Dague Court expressly noted that the 5 language of both of these sections "is similar to that of many other federal fee-shifting statutes, see, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 1988, 2000e-5(k), 7604(d); our case law construing what is a 6 'reasonable' fee applies uniformly to all of them." Id. at 2641 (citing Flight Attendants v. Zipes, 491 U.S. 754, 758 n. 2, 105 L. Ed. 2d 639, 109 S. Ct. 2732 (1989)). 7 8 Given the Court's holding in *Dague*, it is clear that contingency multipliers are no longer permitted under § 1988. Thus, we reverse the portion of the district court's amended order 9 awarding a 2.0 [**32] contingency multiplier in this case. 10 Gates, 987 F.2d at 1403. 11 Defendant, on the other hand cites no Ninth Circuit case law to justify his position. However, if 12 this Court declines to apply Ninth Circuit law, which Plaintiffs believe would be an error, Plaintiffs 13 acknowledge that in California superior courts "[a]n enhancement of the lodestar amount to reflect the 14 15 contingency risk is "[0]ne of the most common fee enhancers" Graham v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 16 34 Cal. 4th 553, 579 (2004). 17 "The purpose of a fee enhancement, or so-called multiplier, for contingent risk is to bring the 18 financial incentives for attorneys enforcing important constitutional rights ... into line with incentives 19 they have to undertake claims for which they are paid on a fee-for-services basis." Ketchum v. Moses, 20 24 Cal. 4th 1122, 1132 (2001). Thus, as explained in Ketchum, the lodestar enhancement "is intended 21 to approximate market-level compensation for such services, which typically includes a premium for 22 23 the risk of nonpayment or delay in payment of attorney fees." Id. at p. 1138. However, here, the 24 attorneys are not sole practitioners, in fact they had five attorneys with hourly rates ranging from 25 , working on a simple Anti-SLAPP motion -- compared to Plaintiffs' lone lawyer with an 26 hourly rate of \$350. Since the claimed hourly rates by Defendant's counsels are already approximately 27 -20-28 3:17-CV-04002-LB PLAINTIFFS' OPPOSITION TO DEFENDENT'S MOTION FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES PURSUANT TO CALIFORNIA CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE § 425.16(C)

Case 3:17-cv-04002-LB Document 78 Filed 03/09/18 Page 25 of 29

8.5 times above the market-level compensation, a contingency multiplier-based lodestar enhancement
for a huge multi-million dollar law firm cannot be warranted.

Furthermore, Defendant states that he was given an alternative fee agreement with a low fixed
cost for litigation of the anti-SLAPP motion. Fee motion, at 16:14. The agreement specifically stated
that in case the Court rendered a favorable decision, he would be awarded attorneys fee and a success
fee of 1.5 times the standard rates. *Id.* 16:19-21. If Defendant did not prevail he would have only been
responsible for the substantially discounted fee for the representation. *Id.* Defendant then claims that
his counsel bore the risk if the Court's ruling would have been unfavorable to him.

This circular argument is flawed. First, *Gates*, *supra*, does not allow a multiplier in matters
 involving fee shifting statutes in Federal Court. Given that the Ninth Circuit ruled that Anti-SLAPP
 motions apply in federal court, the federal standard for denying a multiplier under *Gates*, should apply.

Moreover, the contingent nature of the work was mitigated by the fact that there is a statutory
right to recover attorneys' fees for this work. Thus, there was no risk. Even the agreement clarified that
if the Court did not rule in Defendant's favor, he would have not paid anything over the fixed
substantially low fixed cost. The purpose of the anti-SLAPP statute is to protect the client, not the
attorney. Norman Decl. ¶10.

Defendant cannot have it both ways, he cannot argue on the one hand that it was outrageous for
 Plaintiffs to refuse to dismiss this case early on, or should have let the Court ruled on the initially filed
 motion, and this failure caused increased fees, while on the other hand, claim that this was a complex
 case requiring extensive attorney time utilizing five attorneys at exorbitant billing rates.

- In any case, the Ninth Circuit law should apply, and the success fee multiplier should be
 denied.
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I. NO COURT HAS EVER GRANTED AN AWARD THAT IS REMOTELY SIMILAR TO THE AMOUNT REQUESTED BY DEFENDANTS

A review of reported decisions in California suggests that Defendants' request for attorney's fees and 2 costs is facially unreasonable. These decisions indicate that movants are rarely granted more than 3 4 \$60,000 pursuant to the anti-SLAPP statute. Furthermore, these cases were just as complex, if not 5 more so, than the current litigation. Below is a list of awards of attorney's fees and costs that have been 6 deemed reasonable by the California Court of Appeal or the California Supreme Court since 2000: 7 • \$77,835.25: Bernardo v. Planned Parenthood Federation of America, 115 Cal. App. 4th 322 (2004) 8 (affirming award of reasonable attorney's fees to a national charitable organization annually serving 9 over four million people in suit regarding controversial scientific and medical issues that were of 10 11 public importance and required expert input, scientific data, and worldwide studies) 12 • \$55,900: Tuchscher Development Enterprises, Inc. v. San Diego Unified Port Dist., 106 Cal. App. 13 4th 1219 (2003) (lawsuit against a port district for breach of contract and numerous business tort 14 claims based on alleged conspiracy to disrupt agreement to develop commercial property). 15 • \$7,296.15: Kashian v. Harriman, 98 Cal. App. 4th 892 (2002) (lawsuit against an environmental 16 organization and its attorney alleging causes of action for unfair competition and for defamation 17 following newspaper's report on defendant lawyer's request that Attorney General conduct an 18 19 investigation into the plaintiff's business dealings). 20 • \$45,000: Schroeder v. Irvine City Council, 97 Cal. App. 4th 174 (2002) (lawsuit against the City of 21 Irvine, its city council, and individual council members seeking injunctive and declaratory relief on the 22 grounds that defendants' "Vote 2000" program was an illegal expenditure of public funds). 23 • \$65,386.61: Rosenaur v. Scherer, 88 Cal. App. 4th 260 (2001) (affirming trial court's award of 24 attorneys' fees for \$65,386 in action for defamation and slander stemming from comments made 25 during a bitterly fought local initiative campaign concerning the commercial development of real 26 27 property).

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-22-

Case 3:17-cv-04002-LB Document 78 Filed 03/09/18 Page 27 of 29

\$9,300: Dowling v. Zimmerman, 85 Cal. App. 4th 1400 (2001) (reduction of attorney's fees from an
original request of \$61,862.50 in case stemming from numerous unlawful detainer actions, petitions for
restraining orders, and a suit alleging almost a dozen causes of action).

4 •The only reported decision in which the court reported on the reasonableness of a fee award obtained 5 by Defendants' counsel is Dove Audio, Inc. v. Rosenfeld, Meyer & Susman, 47 Cal. App. 4th 777 6 (1996). In Dove Audio, the son of famed actress Audrey Hepburn hired the law firm of Rosenfeld, 7 Meyer & Susman ("Rosenfeld") to contact other parties that had been bilked out of royalty payments in 8 anticipation of filing a complaint with the Attorney General. Id. at 780. The plaintiff, Dove Audio, then 9 sued the law firm for libel and interference with economic relationship. Id. Rosenfeld, represented by 10 11 Defendants' counsel, then successfully demurred and was granted their motion to strike pursuant to § 12 425.16. Id. at 780-81. On appeal, Dove Audio challenged the award of attorney's fees in the amount of 13 \$28,296. *Id.* at 785. The court of appeal upheld the award on the grounds that although the award was 14 "generous," the court's determination did not "exceed[] the bounds of reason." Id. (emphasis added). 15 Here, Defendants' counsel's Expense Report absolutely exceeds the bounds of reason and exceeds its 16 own request for fees and costs in Dove Audio. The decision in Dove Audio was more complex than the 17 present litigation. Dove Audio involved multiple celebrities; understanding of the sophisticated way in 18 19 which music royalties are calculated; due diligence in identifying, and communicating with, potential 20 celebrity plaintiffs; correspondence with a governmental agency to initiate an investigation; and 21 complex legal issues. Id. at 779-784. In the present case, however, Defendant predominantly argued 22 the *Coastal Abstract* case (including his opposition to summary judgment), stating that this was a 23 disputed legal issue. If \$28,296 were considered generous in *Dove Audio*, certainly a similar amount 24 would be considered generous in this case as well. 25

However, Plaintiffs are aware that in this case more than one motion was filed. Therefore,

- 27 Plaintiffs sought the independent and unbiased evaluation of Mr. Norman who after reviewing all the
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3:17-CV-04002-LB

-23-

Case 3:17-cv-04002-LB Document 78 Filed 03/09/18 Page 28 of 29

pleadings in this matter opined that the total number of hours claimed by Defendant should be between 1 231 and 305 hours without the summary judgment motions and between 271 and 360 hours if the 2 Court considers the summary judgment motions intertwined with the anti-SLAPP motions. Norman 3 4 Decl. ¶7(c). Although Plaintiffs believe Mr. Norman has been generous to Defendants (since Mr. 5 Norman has not examined the under seal, detailed Timekeeper Records and the numerous irrelevant, 6 duplicative, and inefficient practices employed by junior associates without proper guidance), 7 however, Plaintiffs submit to his independent and unbiased assessment and request this Court to accept 8 Mr. Norman's evaluation in its entirety. 9

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J. CALCULATION OF REASONABLE FEE

When using the lodestar method, "court[s] [are] not required to set forth an hour-by-hour
analysis of the fee request." *Gates v. Deukmejian*, 987 F.2d at 1399. Courts can "make across-theboard percentage cuts either in the number of hours claims or in the final lodestar figure as a practical
means of [excluding unreasonable hours] from a fee application." *Id.* When performing such
reductions, the court should explain its reasoning. *Gonzalez v. City of Maywood*, 729 F.3d 1196, 1203
(9th Cir. 2013).

19 III. CONCLUSION

Plaintiffs respectfully submit the Court, considering Mr. Norman's unbiased assessment,

21 substantially reduce the number of hours and fees claimed by Defendant's counsels. In order to assist

the Court with the pertinent calculations, Plaintiffs have provided a fee calculation worksheet

submitted herewith as Chhabra Decl. 17, Ex. 7. Based on the evaluation, any award, including the fees

25 for the summary judgment motions, the Court is requested to grant Defendant a reasonable fee award

26 between **\$65,248** and **\$100,448**, as deemed appropriate.

27 (a) Statement of Decision with Specific Findings

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PLAINTIFFS' OPPOSITION TO DEFENDENT'S MOTION FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES PURSUANT TO CALIFORNIA CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE § 425.16(C)

3:17-CV-04002-LB

-24-

Case 3:17-cv-04002-LB Document 78 Filed 03/09/18 Page 29 of 29

1	Given the fact that Plaintiffs are a small business operation with limited resources, any			
2	monetary reward against Plaintiffs is bound to hurt their business operations. However, based on this			
3	Court's Dec. 21 Order, Plaintiffs understand they are responsible for Defendant's statutorily granted			
4	attorneys' fees and hope the Court finds the detailed analysis with calculations, submitted herein,			
5	reasonable. If, however, this Court disagrees with Plaintiffs' attempt to evaluate a fair and reasonable			
6	fee, Plaintiffs request this Court to provide a statement of decision with specific findings.			
7	(b) Stay on Fees, Pending Appeal			
8 9	Since this matter is currently on appeal, Plaintiffs request any monetary judgment be stayed			
9 10	until Appellate determination.			
11				
12	Date: March 8, 2018			
13				
14	Respectfully Submitted,			
15	CHHABRA LAW FIRM, PC			
16	<u>s/Rohit Chhabra</u> Rohit Chhabra			
17	Attorney for Plaintiffs Open Source Security Inc. & Bradley Spengler			
18	Open source security inc. & Bradley spengler			
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	PLAINTIFFS' OPPOSITION TO DEFENDENT'S MOTION FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES PURSUANT TO CALIFORNIA CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE § 425.16(C)			